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Abstract
We expect rms that face nancial constraints to prioritize shorter term investments over
longer term ones. Using a high quality panel data set, and a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to
control for demand e¤ects, we study whether this has been indeed the case after the sharp deteri-
oration of the nancial conditions for rms in the European periphery. Specically, we compare
Spanish manufacturing rms which are foreign owned (and thus have alternative nancing chan-
nels) to those which are Spanish owned (and thus nancially constrained) along a large number
of dimensions before and after the nancial crisis. We show that, allowing for rm xed e¤ects to
control for unobserved heterogeneity and for industry specic time e¤ects, rms which are cap-
ital constrained reduce employment substantially more (by 6%); reduce investment drastically
(by 19%); and reduce very substantially process innovation and information technology invest-
ment; but they increase their information technology outsourcing and do not signicantly reduce
advertising. This suggests lack of access to nancing is indeed forcing Spanish owned rms to
cut future oriented investments in order to survive for another day. Our ndings are robust to
a number of alternative approaches to control for unobserved, time varying heterogeneity, e.g.
inverse propensity score reweighting, or comparing only within multinationals.
We thank attendants at the LSE/CEP Labour Markets Workshop, at the European Central Banks and Bruegels
"Economic adjustment in the euro area" conference, at the Toulouse Network of Information Technology, as well as
Daron Acemoglu and Samuel Bentolila for very helpful comments.
yLondon School of Economics, CEPR, and Centre for Economic Performance
zLondon School of Economics and Centre for Economic Performance
1
1 Introduction
A large literature has established that nancially constrained rms reduce their investments (e.g.
Whited 1992, Carpenter et al. 1994, Hubbard et al. 1995, Bernanke 1996, Kaplan and Zingales
1997, Lamot 1997, Cleary 1999). Recent studies, using the world wide nancial crisis in 2007/2008
as an exogenous shock to the credit supplied by banks, have conrmed this nding (e.g. Campello
et al 2010, Duchin et al 2010, Almeida et al 2011, Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 2012).
What is less well understood is how credit rationing a¤ects the composition of rm investments.1
And yet, as Aghion et al. (2009) have argued, the impact of credit constraints on the composition of
investment, particularly the share of short term versus long term investments, is an important deter-
minant of the persistence of the shock, and also a¤ects long-term economic growth. Understanding
the impact of credit constraints on the composition of investment is the aim of this paper.
We start by presenting a simple model, based on Aghion et al (2009), of how rm choose the
composition of investment in the face of credit constraints. Firmsinvestment choices fall into two
categories: short-term investments, which have an immediate payo¤, and long-term investments,
which may have a higher payo¤, but one which is realized only after a time lag. Absent liquidity
constraints, rms equalize the value of the marginal dollar on each investment. But, under liquidity
constraints, long term investments involve a risk, because rms might have to liquidate before the
payo¤ period. This creates a wedge between the value of short and long term investments, as rms
are willing to give up future payo¤s in order to secure survival. Thus rms a¤ected by nancial
constraints give up protable long term investment opportunities in favour of worse (in NPV sense)
short term ones.
The empirical part of this paper aims to test the prediction of this model. Specically, we ask:
do rms facing credit constraints cut those investments which pay-o¤ further in the future by more
than investments with a more immediate payo¤?
In order to test the model, we need a taxonomy of investments by their time to payo¤, or
durability. We rely on an extensive literature (reviewed by Corrado et al (2009)) for a ranking
of investment according to durability. Our reading of the evidence is that the most short lived
1A notable exception is Campello et al. (2010), who point out that rms cut technology and marketing investment
by more than capital investment, but do not o¤er an explanation why certain investment types might be more a¤ected
than others.
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investments are brand equity and advertising, followed by software and R&D, with equipment and
capital investment being, on average, the longest lived.
To conduct our analysis we need a dataset with information on a detailed split of di¤erent invest-
ment choices. We use Spanish rm-level data from the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales
(ESEE, Survey of business strategies), a rich, high quality, long-term panel data set of Spanish
manufacturing rms that includes detailed investment variables such as product innovation, process
innovation, LAN, CAD, capital investment, and advertising. We use additional variables like soft-
ware outsourcing, prices, and employment to complement the set of investment variables and draw
a clear picture of rm decisions.
Our empirical strategy relies on a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to identify the e¤ect of credit
tightening on the investment decision of Spanish rms. Like some previous papers, we use the
nancial crisis in 2008 as an exogenous shock to credit supply. This is possible because the 2008
crisis was at its core a banking crisis. Previous research has established that the reduced bank
liquidity translated into a reduction of credit supply to rms (e.g. Iyer et al 2010, Paravisini et al
2011, Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). This is particularly true for Spain, where the liquidity crisis
was severe. Jimenez et al (2012) show that rmsaccess to loans in Spain was reduced after the
nancial crisis, and that rms were unable to substitute loans across less severely a¤ected banks.
Foreign owned rms are less a¤ected by the credit squeeze, since they have access to external
nance via their parent companies (Desai et al 2004). Thus we use foreign owned rms as a
control group for Spanish-owned rms. A worry is that these rms di¤er among a variety of other
dimensions besides access to external funding. For example, Spanish owned rms in our data are
typically smaller and less likely to export, therefore they might also have been subject to di¤erent
demand shocks which would confound our analysis. To take this heterogeneity into account, all
our analyses use rm and industry*year xed e¤ects to control for unobserved time-invariant rm
characteristic, and industry specic shocks (e.g. demand shocks) that occur in some periods in
some industries. Moreover, we present a variety of robustness checks. Most notably, we restrict
the sample to multinationals, comparing Spanish owned to foreign owned multinationals. These
rms are all large, have subsidiaries in many countries and are heavily export oriented, the only
di¤erence between them being the nationality of their majority shareholder. Alternatively, we use
an inverse propensity score reweighting scheme based on the size, growth and export status and
export development of rms before the nancial crisis, which basically matches foreign owned rms
to comparable Spanish ones. The results are the very similar, which gives us additional condence
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that we are picking up the right e¤ect.
In none of our specications do we see a di¤erential e¤ect of credit constraints on sales or exports,
which increases our condence that di¤erential demand shocks are not driving the results. In
addition, we show that we dont see our results in placebo tests, e.g. in non-crisis years, or for the
1993 economic crisis which was characterized by a demand shock rather than a liquidity shock.
Our results are consistent with the theoretical predictions: We do not observe a reduction in
advertising, the investment category with the smallest time-to-payo¤. Interestingly, however, nan-
cially constrained rms increased prices by more, suggesting they were harvesting customer loyalty
at the expense of future market shares, an observation rst made by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995
and 1996).
On the other hand, the investment with the longest time-to-payo¤, capital investment, faced
the largest reduction: Spanish owned rms cut investment by 19% more than their foreign owned
counterparts after the nancial crisis hit. They also reduced employment by 6% more. Permanent
employment (as opposed to outsourcing or temporary labour) is an investment in human capital,
consistent with our notion of long-term investments.
Investments in IT and R&D have a medium-term payo¤ according to the literature. Indeed, we
see moderate reductions of around 8-9% in IT equipment such as CAD, LAN and exible systems.
At the same time, rmsreliance on outsourced software application and programming increased
substantially, by 10% and 14%, respectively. It appears that rms were substituting outsourced
labour for these investment cuts, suggesting that, like in our theory, faced with credit constraints,
rms replace the long term commitment implicit in having an internal IT labour force with the
short term commitment allowed by outsourcing. Spanish owned rms are trying to rent rather than
buy in order to survive the very near future.
Concerning R&D, the drop is also intermediate between the two extremes of advertising and
tangible capital investment. Moreover product innovation has a more immediate payo¤ than process
innovation, and the fact that we observe smaller reductions in product innovation (5%) than in
process innovation (9%) is in accordance with our predictions.
In sum, we identify large changes in the composition of investment in Spanish rms, which are
consistent with the patterns that the theory led us to believe: essentially no change in very short
term investments (advertising), very large changes for xed, durable investments, and intermediate
changes for software/IT and R&D investments.
Our paper is structured as follows. We rst develop a simple theoretical framework about the
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composition of investments of credit constrained rms. We then go on to discuss briey the evidence
on the durability of investment, the case of Spain and the data. Finally we discuss our empirical
identication strategy and present our results.
2 Theoretical Framework: Short vs. long run investment and liq-
uidity risk
Most theoretical analysis of liquidity constraints aggregates all investment into one single decision
(e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Instead, we assume that a prot maximizing rm must choose
between two types of investment: Short-term investments kt yield an immediate payo¤ of f(kt),
while long-term investments zt yield a higher payo¤ (1 + )f(zt), which is paid out at a later
period. To capture this trade-o¤ we rely on a model that is a simplied version of Aghion et al.
(2009). The key di¢ culty of rms is that they have only with some probability t+1 enough liquidity
to withstand the wait for the long term payo¤. In other words, with probability 1 t+1 a liquidity
crisis in the interim period may simply force the rm to liquidate. The probability of survival t+1
measures the probability that the entrepreneur will have enough funds to cover the liquidity shock
and is allowed to depend on the levels of short and long term investments. Specically, reallocating
investments from long to short term increases the probability of survival,

@t+1
@kt
  @t+1@zt

> 0. The
choice of how much short run and long run investment to undertake is then given by:
max
kt;zt
Et [f(kt) + t+1(1 + )f(zt)  qtkt   qtzt]
where t+1 measures the probability that the entrepreneur will have enough funds to cover the
liquidity shock,  is the additional productivity of long term investment, and the rest of terms have
their usual meanings.
The rst order conditions are, with respect to k:
Et

f 0(kt)

+ Et

@t+1
@kt
(1 + )f(zt)

= qt
and with respect to z:
Et

t+1(1 + )f
0(zt)

+ 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
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(1 + )f(zt)

= qt
or, combining the two equations, we obtain the marginal condition:
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While in the rst best, absent liquidity shocks, it should be the case that the marginal value of a
dollar is equalized across both types of investments:
Et

f 0(kt)

= Et

(1 + )f 0(zt)

:
Thus the risk that the rm will run out of cash in period t+1 works exactly like a tax on investment
 t+1; and reduces the value of the (a priori more protable) long term investments relative to the
rst best. The rst term of this wedge (1  t+1) captures the probability of failure. The second
term captures the marginal change in this probability as we reallocate investment from long term to
short term. Given that reallocating investments from long term to short term reduces the probabity
of survival, the tax wedge  t+1 > 0. Hence the reallocation away from long term investment
opportunities to short term ones is higher the higher the probability of avoiding bankrupcy by
doing this, the higher the probability of not having enough liquidity next period, and the lower the
marginal productivity of long run investments.
In this model, credit constraints are liquidity shocks that reduce the probability of survival to the
payo¤ period. The model predicts that credit constrained rms will reduce long term investment
by more than short term investment in order to secure survival. In the following empirical section
we aim to test this hypothesis.
3 Data and empirical strategy
In the empirical part of this paper we draw on the literature to specify the time-to-payo¤ of di¤erent
investment types which allows us to test our theory. Then we present our data source, a Spanish
rm level survey that encompasses very detailed information about our key outcome variables, a
variety of di¤erent investment types. We go on to discuss our identication strategy, a di¤erence-
in-di¤erences specication based on the ownership nationality of rms.
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3.1 Identifying Long and Short Term Investments
The theory allows us to make predictions about the behavior of di¤erent investment variables de-
pending on the horizon over which they pay o¤. For the model to guide our empirical work, we need
a taxonomy of tangible and intangible investments by their durability. Accountants and growth ac-
countants have undertaken a lot of work aiming to estimate the durability of tangible investments,
but the literature on intangible investment lifespan is neither extensive nor conclusive.
The shortest lived investment category is brand equity and advertising. Landes and Roseneld
(1994) estimate the annual rates of decay of advertising to be 60%, using 20 two-digit SIC manu-
facturing and service industries. An upper bound on the econometric estimates is Ayanian (1983),
who estimates a durability of up to 7 years.
The literature reports higher durability for software investments. The Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis (BEA 1994) estimated a depreciation rate of 33% for a 5 year service life, according to Corrado
et al (2009). Tamai and Torimitsu (1992) report a 10 years average life span for software, relying
on industry estimates based on survey evidence.
The evidence on the average depreciation rates and average lifespans of R&D capital is more
extensive, although the ranges are very wide. Adams (1990) estimates a depreciation rate of 9%
to 13% for basic research. Pakes and Schankerman (1984) proposed 11% to 12% per year in some
countries and 17% to 26% in the United Kingdom. Nadiri and Prucha (1996) estimated a rate of
12% for industrial R&D, while Bernstein and Mamuneas (2006) estimate the depreciation rate at
18%. For Europe, Pakes and Schankerman (1978), estimated a 25% average rate, while Pakes and
Schankerman (1986) propose a range between 11% and 26%.
Finally, the longest lived investments involve xed investment and equipment. According to the
BEAs estimates2, private non residential equipment has a durability of between 7 (o¢ ce equipment)
and 27 years (shipping), while private non residential structures last between 16 and 54 years.
According to this literature review we classify brand equity and advertising as "short term",
software and R&D as "medium term", and capital investment as "long term" investments.
3.2 Data
We rely on the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), a panel of Spanish manufacturing
rms. This data has been collected by the Spanish government and the SEPI foundation every year
since 1990. The survey covers around 1,800 Spanish manufacturing rms per year, surveying all
2Please see http://www.bea.gov/scb/account_articles/national/wlth2594/tableC.htm)
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rms with more than 200 employees and a stratied sample of smaller rms. The coverage is
about 50-60% of large rms, and 5-25% of small rms. The sample started out as a representative
sample of the population of Spanish manufacturing rms. In order to reduce the deterioration of
representativeness due to non-responding rms, every year new companies are re-sampled in order
to replace exiting ones.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables that are the object of our analysis,
before and after the crisis. The analysis shows that the credit crunch triggered by the nancial crisis
is reected in the Spanish data: The credit ratio (total credit as a percentage of total assets) of rms
fell by 3 percentage points after the crisis, from 57% to 54%. At the same time, average credit cost
fell by 0.1 percentage points, from 4.38% to 4.28%. However, a closer look at the data shows that
the credit cost didnt fall immediately: Instead, in 2008, they increased sharply to 4.66%. Together
with the observed immediate drop in the credit ratio this suggests that we observe a credit supply
rather than a credit demand shock immediately after the nancial crisis hit. Credit cost fell only
after 2009, a result of the low interest rates stipulated by the European Central Bank in order to
stimulate economic growth. However, the credit ratio stays at the lower level even in those years.
The analysis aims to estimate the e¤ect of the credit squeeze on a range of di¤erent rm deci-
sions, with a focus on investment in technology, but also more broadly investment in capital, R&D,
advertising, etc. Table 1 shows that employment, wages and investment of Spanish rms fell after
the crisis, while process innovation increased and product innovation fell. Also sales and exports of
Spanish rms fell, together with advertising expenses.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The key identication problem we confront is to separate the supply from the demand aspects of
the shock that hit Spain during the nancial crisis, because - although some time later than other
countries - Spain entered a recession in 2008. In order to tackle these challenges to identication,
we apply a di¤erence-in-di¤erences specication where we compare the behaviour of rms that are
a¤ected by the credit crunch to the behaviour of rms that su¤er less from restricted access to
credit, while facing similar demand conditions. We shall experiment with di¤erent treatment and
control groups along various dimensions.
Our main identication strategy consists in comparing stand alone Spanish rms with those that
are part of a foreign multinational. The nancial crisis reduced access to credit sharply in countries
at the European periphery like Spain. However, while those belonging to a foreign group maintain
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their access to credit, standalone Spanish rms are at the mercy of the now scarcer bank loans.
The key challenge is that rms in foreign groups and those not in foreign groups are di¤erent along
many dimensions besides access to credit. The aim of all of our analysis is to tackle this challenge.
In order to control for ex ante di¤erences between Spanish and foreign owned rms, we use
two types of xed e¤ects: Firm xed e¤ects allow us to control for unobserved, time invariant
heterogeneity in rmsrisks and demand for credit. In addition, industry*year specic xed e¤ects
allow for industry specic demand shocks that were caused by the crisis. Our main strategy is thus
to run panel regressions, including rm and industry*year xed e¤ects, where we ask: Once the
credit crunch hits, how do the investment decisions of the more constrained (Spanish) rms di¤er
from those of the foreign multinationals? Our baseline regression is as follows:
yit = 0 + 1(TG  after crisis)it + firm FE + ind  year FE + "it
In all regressions, standard errors are two-way clustered at the rm and industry*year level, to
allow for a correlation of the error within rms across years, and across rms in the same industry
in a given year (e.g. any industry specic shock).
We then present a whole range of robustness checks. First, we try to avoid the endogeneity of the
nationality of ownership by using as treatment the foreign ownership 2 years before the analysis. We
then use the current share of Spanish ownership as treatment intensity, instead of discrete ownership
variable, and also lag it by 2 years. We also allow for di¤erent linear time trends across treatment
and control group.
There is still a concern that foreign owned rms might not be a suitable counterfactual group, as
they tend to be bigger and more internationally oriented than the average Spanish rm. We do three
di¤erent robustness checks to adjust for this di¤erence, which leave our conclusions unchanged. First,
we add a size control to the regressions as we worry that foreign owned rms tend to be larger than
Spanish rms. Second, we pursue the analysis focusing only on multinational groups, both Spanish
and foreign, to make the rms more comparable both in terms of their size and their international
orientation. Third, we use inverse propensity score reweighting based on size and export status in
all pre-crisis years in order to construct a comparable treatment and control group.
Finally, we undertake placebo tests. We conduct our entire analysis on every year in the 2000
decade, and nd that the results turn only signicant in the years of the nancial crisis. We also
compare the current results with the 1993 crisis, which was a demand driven recession, rather than
a credit crunch like during the current crisis. Conrming our hypothesis, we nd di¤erent results
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for the demand-driven recession compared to the credit cruch of the recent nancial crisis.
4 Results
4.1 Credit
In Table 2 we start by comparing credit of Spanish and foreign rms. The dependent variable is
the total credit to asset ratio, and the main regressor is an interaction between a Spanish ownership
dummy and a time dummy for the nancial crisis (which is turned on in 2008 and after). Column
(1) controls for industry specic demand conditions using the industrys exports and size as a
time varying control. Also, rm level xed e¤ects allow us to control for any other time invariant
unobserved rm heterogeneity. In other words, the table answers the question: Comparing two
rms of the same size that are facing the same demand conditions, does the rm that happens to be
Spanish su¤er a signicant drop in credit after the crisis? The answer is unambiguous and highly
signicant: Spanish rms su¤er a drop in credit of around 2.3% (that is 230 basis points) after
the crisis compared to non-Spanish rms. In column (2) we add time xed e¤ects to capture any
common, time varying aspects of the crisis that are not yet captured by industry exports or size,
and the e¤ect is even stronger, 3.1%. Column (3) is our most demanding specication, which allows
for industry specic time e¤ects (and thus absorbs our previous industry specic controls), and the
result is again stronger, with Spanish rms facing a credit drop of 3.8%. This is equivalent to a
6.6% drop in credit relative to the 2007 baseline of 57.8% credit to assets (with standard deviation
of 22.9%) for Spanish rms before the crisis.
Table 3 compares the credit costs to Spanish and foreign rms using the same type of analyses,
and nds no signicant di¤erence in our most demanding specication. The fact that the constraint
is reected in quantities rather than prices is consistent with most observations of price rigidities in
Spain (e.g. large drops in employment and not in wages, large drops in housing sales with no/small
initial drops in house prices). Also, while Spanish rms obtained less credit, the equality of credit
cost shows that the underlying risk of the credit obtained is similar across Spanish and foreign owned
rms.
4.2 Main Results: Impact of the crisis on investments
Table 4 analyzes rmsdecisions. For ease of presentation we divide the decisions in two categories:
we start with innovation and IT investment decisions, and then we discuss the rest of the decisions
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on which we have data, e.g. employment, prices, advertising and other.
Innovation and Information Technology. Column (1) uses capital investment as a dependent
variable, the investment type with the longest payo¤period. Consistent with our theory, this variable
is a¤ected by most, dropping by around 19% in Spanish rms post crisis relative to non Spanish rms.
R&D, our medium-term investment, is represented by product and process innovation. Columns
(2) and (3) show that Spanish rms decrease product innovation by 5% and process innovation by
9%. Consistent with our theory, these e¤ects are smaller than for capital investment. Although we
dont have data on this, it seems plausible for product innovation to have a more immediate payo¤
than process innovation, explaining the di¤erence in the impact between the two R&D types. Our
other medium term investment type, investment in information technology, is also reduced, although
not quite as strongly as capital investment, as can be seen in columns (4) to (5): the presence of
computer aided design (CAD) su¤ers a relative drop of 8%, and the presence of local area networks
(LAN) and of exible manufacturing systems is reduced by around 10%. We found it interesting
to report the impact on software outsourcing as well: It seems that, possibly substituting for these
investment cuts in technology, rmsreliance on outsourced sofware programming and application
increased substantially: by 14% and 10%, respectively.
Employment, Prices and Other choices. Columns (1) to (3) in the second panel of Table 4
show the di¤erential behavior of Spanish owned rms in labour decisions. After the crisis, Spanish
owned rms reduced employment by 5% while increasing overtime by more than half. The result
was a reduction in the total wage bill of around 4%. This indicates that average wages didnt fall,
otherwise the fall in employment would have resulted in a more than proportionate fall in the wage
bill. It is not surprising that while wages are not reduced, employment is. Credit constrained rms
in Spain adjust through employment and not wages. While in line with previous overwhelming
evidence on the rigidity of wage bargaining in Spain, this result is if anything more surprising, as
e¢ ciency should dictate any creditors of the rm (including workers) to allow the rm to "borrow"
when bank credit disappears. In other words, such a wage adjustment does not need to lead to any
redistribution in the longer run.
In column (4) we use a rm specic price index as dependent variable, which we constructed
from survey responses about the change in average sales prices (weighted across the product range).
Price variables are rarely available in rm level data sets, and have therefore been rarely analyzed.
The result is surprising: Credit constrained rms increase their prices by 2.7 percentage points. A
rationale for this behaviour is consistent with our short term vs. long term investment view: Firms
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might be able to increase current prots exploiting the habit persistence of their customers at the
cost of reducing future prots from upset customers.
In column (5) we report our most "short term" investment type, advertising. The result shows
that rms do not reduce their advertising, in line with the predictions of our theory.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the results of some dependent variables: employment,
investment, process innovation and advertising.
Finally, it is reassuring that we dont see a signicant di¤erence in treatment and control group in
terms of sales and exports, as this suggests our strategy to control for demand shocks was successful,
i.e. Spanish and foreign rms are not on di¤erent growth trajectories.
4.3 Robustness tests
As mentioned before, comparing Spanish owned and foreign owned rms might not be valid, as
these rms might di¤er along a number of unobserved dimensions. For this reason we conduct a
number of robustness checks using alternative specications. These are reported in Table 5, where
each row represents a di¤erent specication. Each regression follows our baseline setup by including
a full set of rm xed e¤ects and industry*year xed e¤ects.
The rst row in Table 5 presents our baseline results for comparison purposes. The second row
denes the treatment group as ownership two years before the crisis, in order to allow for the possible
endogeneity of foreign ownership. The third row uses a continuous ownership share instead of the
discrete ownership dummy variable in the baseline specication. In other words, Spanish ownership
becomes the treatment intensity. In the fourth row, we use the same treatment intensity of Spanish
ownership share, but lag it by 2 years again.
The results are basically robust to all these specications, with some weaker results for investment,
CAD, exible systems and employment when we use the lagged ownership variables. However, the
drop in process innovation and LAN, as well as the increases in outsourcing, overtime hours and
prices, and the insignicant e¤ect on advertising persist.
In row 5 we return to our baseline specication, but now allow for a di¤erent linear trend in
treatment and control group to deal with the worry that Spanish and foreign owned rms show
di¤erent trends in their investment behaviour. Here the employment trend is still clear, the invest-
ment drop is of similar magnitude but more imprecise, the product and process innovation e¤ects
are consistent and IT outsourcing becomes smaller. Only our price increase result is reduced. In
row 6 we return to the treatment intensity specication and add the di¤erential linear trends. The
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results are similar.
While we have controlled for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, one might worry about
time varying unobserved heterogeneity of Spanish and foreign owned rms (that goes beyond a
group-specic linear trend, which we have already controlled for above). If foreign rms were on a
di¤erent growth trajectory than Spanish rms, this might impact our results of observing di¤erent
raising of credit. The next three rows are concerned with this kind of unobserved, time-varying
heterogeneity.
The simplest way to control for di¤erent growth trajectories is to control for size (i.e. log of
sales), which we do in row 7 (note that the initial size is already absorbed by the rm xed e¤ect).
The downside is that this variable is endogenous, so we have to be careful in interpreting it. But
reassuringly, the results are basically unchanged, except for investment which is still of similar
magnitude, but measured more imprecisely.
Another dimension of time-varying, unobserved heterogeneity might be di¤erences between com-
panies that operate across countries and those that operate in a single country. Companies that
operate in many countries belong to a corporate group, and this could provide companies with
advantages that go beyond their access to capital. For example they might face a more diversied
demand. Row 8 conducts our analysis only for companies that belong to a corporate group, presum-
ably most of them are multinationals. The results are pretty remarkable. Even though the sample
size drops very substantially (by more than half), the signs are all the same (except for sales, which
is however small and insignicant across all specications), the magnitudes are remarkably constant
(except for employment, which is halved) and they mostly remain signicant.3
Finally, another way to make the control group a more suitable counterfactual for the treatment
group is inverse propensity score reweighting. By reweighting each observation by their (inverse)
propensity score (the "likelihood" that a rm belongs to the treatment group, i.e. is under Spanish
ownership) we aim to reproduce the distribution of Spanish rms more closely by foreign owned
rms, and therefore also match the unobserved time varying heterogeneity better. We construct
propensity scores based on sales and export status of all pre-treatment years. Our results, in row 9,
are also robust to this test. Most of the results are numerically very close to the baseline specication,
suggesting that selection is not a major concern in our analysis.
3We have used alternative denitions to proxy for "multinationals" in the data: e.g. by dening multinationals
as those that have foreign a¢ liates, or those who have non-industrial plants in foreign countries, or share holdings
in foreign countries. The results all show the same pattern as our main analysis in terms of signs and magnitudes of
coe¢ cients.
13
Our reading of the evidence is that although some results lose signicance in some specications,
overall our results are highly consistent across a large number of di¤erent robustness specications.
4.4 Placebo tests and IV regressions
Table 6 presents an even stronger check: It conducts placebo tests separately for each year (omitting
the baseline year 2000). We expect a statistically signicant e¤ect on the interaction terms only for
the years 2008 to 2010, i.e. after the nancial crisis, and none before.
The placebo tests are in line with our analysis so far, showing signicant results for most variables
only in the post crisis years. The fall in investment is strongest in 2009, and fades out somewhat in
2010. Product innovation is not signicant in any specic year after the crisis, but the coe¢ cient
turned negative in 2008 and all years after. The strongest and most persistent negative e¤ect of
the credit crunch is in process innovation, which is negative and signicant in 2008 and all years
after. The other technology variables are surveyed only every 4 years (2002, 2006 and 2010), so
the placebo test is just conducted in 2006 and 2010. For all variables but CAD the drop in 2010 is
strong compared to the pre-crisis observation in 2006.
The drop in employment as well as the rise in prices also is strikingly in line with the nancial
crisis and highly persistent over the post-crisis years. At the same time, advertising expenses dont
change signicantly over the whole period. In the bottom rows of the tables we conduct t-tests
of testing for the di¤erence in the treatment e¤ects of 2008, 2009 and 2010 versus 2007 (and 2010
versus 2006 for variables that are surveyed only every 4 years), the last pre-treatment observation.
Again, they conrm the drop in investment, technology, employment and wage bill in the post crisis
years compared to last pre-crisis observation.
How di¤erent is this behaviour of rms from a normalrecession, i.e. a recession not driven by
credit squeeze? In order to address this issue and conrm that the observed e¤ects are really due
to the credit squeeze, we compare the reactions of rms with those in 1993, the last major, demand
driven, Spanish recession before the nancial crisis in 2008.
Table 7 shows that the 2008 crisis is di¤erent: In a normal, demand shock driven, recession,
rms cut neither employment nor IT investment or outsourcing or outsourcing, however, they do
cut product and process innovation. On the other hand, they reduce advertising expenditure and
wages, the price e¤ect is still there. Note that data for capital investment and LAN is not available
in the survey before 1993. From the last two columns it is visible that the 1993 crisis was a demand
driven crisis, as sales and exports fall for the treatment group.
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Our main interest lies in understanding how limited access to credit a¤ects the investment be-
haviour of rms. So far we have compared Spanish to foreign owned rms, but our main variable
of interest is actually credit. We can therefore use the credit ratio of Table 2 as a regressor, and
instrument it with Spanish ownership. Basically Table 2 becomes the rst stage of this instrumental
variable regression, while all the tables shown so far correspond to the "reduced form" version. Table
8 implements these IV regressions. The results are obviously in line with the reduced form results,
but allow for a di¤erent interpretation: A reduction of access to credit by 1% in the credit ratio
leads to 9% fall in investment. (Note that the signs are inverted as now the regressions describe
the impact of credit, not lack therof.) Overall, the rst stage is strong, as we have seen in Table
2, but since our sample is somewhat di¤erent for each dependent variable, we report the rst stage
F-statistics separately for each regression. The F-statistics is su¢ ciently large for all regressions
except for investment.
5 Conclusions
Our analysis has two readings, a macro and a micro one: the macro view concerns Spain and the
crisis in the eurozone, while the micro view focuses on nance and the decisions of rms.
On the macro side, the paper suggests that the breakdown of the single European capital market
is likely to have long term e¤ects on Spanish rms. Spanish rms which are a¤ected by the credit
squeeze cut investments with a medium- to long-term payo¤, such as R&D, innovation and capital
investment, by more than investment with a short-term payo¤such as advertising. Credit constraints
force Spanish rms to eat up their future and act as if only the immediate future, tomorrow,
mattered. This is likely to have a long term impact on the Spanish economy, impeding recovery
after the nancial crisis, and reducing long-term economic growth.
On the micro side, our analysis teaches us about what rms do when they are worried about
liquidity. We showed that, as the theory predicts, they prioritize investments that pay o¤ in the near
future, such as advertising and product innovation, over investments that have a more uncertain
or long term payo¤, like process innovation, information technology and capital investment. We
also showed that rms cut employment, but not wages - probably a Spanish ideosyncracy - and,
surprisingly, that rms increase prices signicantly, probably aiming to harvest customer loyalty on
the short run.
All in all, the credit crunch appears to be placing Spanish rms at a severe competitive disad-
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vantage relative to their foreign competitors. Moreover, this disadvantage is likely to persist quite
far into the future, given the investment and innovation drops that have long term implications for
economic growth. Future research must quantify the impact of these innovation and investment
decreases on GDP growth.
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APPENDIX 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
Before crisis  
(2000-2007) 
After crisis 
(2008-2010) 
Change 
(t-test) 
    
Credit    
Credit ratio (total credit/total assets) 0.57 0.54 -0.03*** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (-7.92) 
Credit cost
1
, % 4.38 4.28 -0.10*** 
 (1.19) (1.31) (-2.80) 
    
Innovation and Information Technology    
Investment, mn EUR 5.67 2.72 -2.95 
 (117.4) (161.2) (-1.22) 
Share of firms conducting 0.21 0.19 -0.02*** 
product innovation (0.41) (0.39) (-3.62) 
Share of firms conducting  0.31 0.34 0.03*** 
process innovation (0.46) (0.47) (3.73) 
Share of firms using CAD 0.39 0.41 0.02 
 (0.49) (0.49) (1.39) 
Share of firms using a LAN 0.26 0.34 0.08*** 
 (0.44) (0.47) (6.35) 
Share of firms using flexible  0.26 0.30 0.04*** 
manufacturing systems (0.44) (0.46) (3.83) 
Share of firms outsourcing software  0.65 0.65 0 
programming (fully or partially) (0.48) (0.48) (0) 
Share of firms outsourcing software  0.70 0.70 0 
application (fully or partially) (0.46) (0.46) (0.14) 
    
Employment, Prices and Other choices    
Employment
2
   260 203 -57*** 
 (780) (682) (-5.19) 
Average overtime hours per employee 11.49 7.95 -3.54*** 
 (27.41) (23.63) (-9.25) 
Wage bill, mn EUR 10.04 9.22 -0.82 
 (32.85) (33.89) (-1.59) 
Price index
3
 1.05 1.12 0.07*** 
 (0.11) (0.20) (23.07) 
Advertising expenditure, mn EUR 152.61 118.77 -33.84** 
 (967.77) (993.00) (-2.23) 
Sales, mn EUR 74.50 64.37 -10.13** 
 (348.96) (300.70) (-2.08) 
Exports, mn EUR 28.11 24.43 -3.68 
 (218.72) (185.27) (-1.22) 
1 Total cost of a credit (including interest rates, but also other fees) as a percentage of obtained credit.  
2 Employment is the number of employees as of 31 December of a given year. The number includes full time, part 
time, and temporary workers employed by the firm; but not temporary workers  employed by temporary work 
agencies 
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3 The firm specific price index is 1 in 2000 (or in the first year the firm appears in the survey), and changes each year 
by the average price change of the firm’s products, weighted by the product mix. Comparing the absolute price index 
across firms is not meaningful, our regressions use firm fixed effects and therefore rely on the comparison of the price 
index over time instead. 
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Table 2. Deleveraging of Spanish and foreign firms. 
 
Notes: This table checks whether Spanish owned and foreign owned firms are affected differently 
by the credit squeeze. The dependent variable is credit ratio (total credit divided by total assets, ratio 
between 0 and 1). The main regressor is an interaction term of a Spanish ownership dummy 
(defined by <=50% foreign ownership in same year) and a time dummy variable that indicates the 
financial crisis (=1 in and after 2008). All columns include firm fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) 
control for industry specific demand variables (Spanish exports to EU, Spanish exports to the 
World, domestic value added per industry) to capture industry specific demand shocks of the 
recession driven by the financial crisis. Export data is from the WITS database provided by the 
Worldbank, and Spanish value added per industry is from National Accounts data provided by the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). Column (2) includes year fixed effects to capture 
common time effects. Column (3) includes a full set of industry*year specific fixed effects to 
capture any demand specific effects driven by the crisis (our industry controls are absorbed by these 
fixed effects and therefore omitted). All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and 
industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2000 and 2010. 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) 
Credit ratio (between 0 and 1)    
    
Interaction term (Spanish firms) * (after 2008) -0.0234*** -0.0306*** -0.0378*** 
 (0.00409) (0.01000) (0.0103) 
ln(industry exports to EU) 0.00117 0.0501  
 (0.0351) (0.0360)  
ln(industry exports to World) -0.000615 -0.0339  
 (0.0352) (0.0365)  
ln(industry value added) 0.00678 0.0179  
 (0.0125) (0.0137)  
    
Observations 18,983 18,983 18,983 
R-squared 0.006 0.003 0.002 
Number of firmid 3,051 3,051 3,051 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO 
Ind*Year FE NO NO YES 
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Table 3. Credit cost of Spanish and foreign firms. 
 
Notes: This table compares the credit cost of Spanish owned and foreign owned firms after the 
financial crisis. The dependent variable is the average credit cost (rate is between 0 and 100). The 
main regressor is an interaction term of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign 
ownership in same year) and a time dummy variable that indicates the financial crisis (=1 in and 
after 2008). All columns include firm fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) control for industry 
specific demand variables (Spanish exports to EU, Spanish exports to the World, domestic value 
added per industry) to capture industry specific demand shocks of the recession driven by the 
financial crisis. Export data is from the WITS database provided by the Worldbank, and Spanish 
value added per industry is from National Accounts data provided by the Spanish National Institute 
of Statistics (INE). Column (2) includes year fixed effects to capture common time effects. Column 
(3) includes a full set of industry*year specific fixed effects to capture any demand specific effects 
driven by the crisis (our industry controls are absorbed by these fixed effects and therefore omitted). 
All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2000 and 2010. 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) 
Credit cost (from 0 to 100) in %    
    
Interaction term (Spanish firms) * (after 2008) 0.113 -0.0830 -0.0911 
 (0.0742) (0.222) (0.200) 
ln(industry exports to EU) -1.600** -0.537  
 (0.670) (0.450)  
ln(industry exports to World) 1.306** 0.665  
 (0.656) (0.439)  
ln(industry value added) -0.0773 0.0140  
 (0.187) (0.180)  
    
Observations 4,613 4,613 4,613 
R-squared 0.015 0.002 0.000 
Number of firmid 1,156 1,156 1,156 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO 
Ind*Year FE NO NO YES 
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Table 4. Investment vector of Spanish and foreign firms. 
 
Notes: This table compares a variety of investment decisions of Spanish owned and Foreign owned 
firms after the financial crisis. The dependent variable is stated in the head of each column. The 
main regressor is an interaction term of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign 
ownership in same year) and a time dummy variable that indicates the financial crisis (=1 in and 
after 2008). All columns include firm fixed effects and a full set of industry*year specific fixed 
effects to capture any demand specific effects driven by the crisis. All standard errors are two-way 
clustered at the firm and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are 
between 2000 and 2010. 
 
 
3A. Innovation and Information Technology 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(invest 
ment) 
Product 
innovation 
dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD dummy LAN dummy Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software 
programming  
outsource  
dummy 
Software 
application  
outsource  
dummy 
         
Interaction term (Spanish firms) -0.187* -0.053** -0.088*** -0.076** -0.096** -0.11** 0.140*** 0.104** 
* (after 2008) (0.112) (0.0227) (0.0251) (0.0384) (0.0439) (0.0429) (0.0421) (0.0404) 
         
Observations 12,351 19,348 19,612 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,256 4,256 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Number of firmid 2,432 3,093 3,112 1,733 1,733 1,733 1,729 1,729 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
3B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average  
overtime 
hours) 
ln(wagebill) Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
ln(sales) ln(exports) 
        
Interaction term (Spanish firms)  -0.056*** 0.630* -0.038* 0.0271*** -0.041 -0.0500 -0.0602 
* (after 2008) (0.0215) (0.360) (0.0208) (0.00966) (0.0606) (0.0316) (0.0578) 
        
Observations 19,612 19,558 19,609 19,592 13,454 19,609 12,405 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 3,104 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Number of firmid 3,112 3,106 3,111 3,104 2,378 3,111 2,053 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Figure 1. Spanish owned versus foreign owned firms. 
 
Notes: These graphs plot the difference of the average dependent variable (in title) between Spanish 
firms (defined by <=50% foreign ownership in same year) and foreign owned firms (defined by 
>50% foreign ownership in same year) over years, after controlling for industry specific year 
effects.  
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   Treatment group: Spanish firms (defined by <=50% foreign ownership 
in same year)  
 – –  Control group: Foreign owned firms (defined by >50% foreign 
ownership in same year) 
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Table 5. Robustness checks 
 
Notes: This table conducts a variety of robustness checks to our main specification as in the last 
table. The dependent variable is stated in the head of each column. Each row represents a different 
regression. Each regression includes a full set of firm fixed effects and industry*year fixed effects, 
just as in the baseline specification. Standard errors are two-way clustered at firm level and 
industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions in the different rows are: 
Baseline: Same as in table X. Treatment group: Spanish firms (defined by 
<=50% foreign ownership in same year); control group: foreign 
owned firms (defined by >50% foreign ownership in same year) 
2.  The treatment and control groups are defined based on foreign 
ownership 2 years before  
3.  The current share of Spanish ownership is used as treatment 
intensity  
4.  The treatment intensity is based on the Spanish ownership share 2 
years prior  
5.  We return to our baseline specification, but now allow for a 
different linear trends in treatment and control group 
6.  We return to the treatment intensity specification (specification 3), 
but now allow for a different linear trends in treatment and 
control group 
7.  Add ln(sales) as control; use current share of Spanish ownership 
as treatment intensity 
8. Use only multinationals defined as companies that belong to a 
corporate group; use current share of Spanish ownership as 
treatment intensity 
9. Inverse propensity score reweighting method, based on average 
sales and exporter status in pre-treatment years (2000 to 2007) 
 
5A. Innovation and Information Technology 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(invest 
ment) 
Product 
innovation 
dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD 
dummy 
LAN 
dummy 
Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software 
programming  
outsource  
dummy 
Software 
application  
outsource 
dummy 
          
Baseline:  (Spanish firms)  -0.187* -0.0535** -0.0885*** -0.0759** -0.0959** -0.109** 0.140*** 0.104** 
 * (after 2008) (0.112) (0.0227) (0.0251) (0.0384) (0.0439) (0.0429) (0.0421) (0.0404) 
2.  (Spanish firms 2 yrs ago) -0.132 -0.0277 -0.0781*** -0.0512 -0.112** -0.0273 0.146*** 0.129*** 
 * (after 2008) (0.123) (0.0228) (0.0280) (0.0472) (0.0526) (0.0501) (0.0530) (0.0433) 
3. (Spanish ownership)  -0.204* -0.0531** -0.0866*** -0.0798** -0.0919** -0.119*** 0.129*** 0.103** 
 * (after 2008) (0.115) (0.0234) (0.0257) (0.0393) (0.0452) (0.0413) (0.0427) (0.0408) 
4. (Spanish ownership 2 yrs ago)  -0.175 -0.0275 -0.0768*** -0.0447 -0.120** -0.0489 0.134** 0.115*** 
 * (after 2008) (0.126) (0.0232) (0.0285) (0.0473) (0.0548) (0.0515) (0.0542) (0.0446) 
5.  (Spanish firms)  -0.214 -0.0776*** -0.0830*** -0.181*** -0.0421 -0.0899 0.245*** 0.0728 
 * (after 2008) (0.136) (0.0245) (0.0301) (0.0585) (0.0658) (0.0723) (0.0672) (0.0621) 
6.  (Spanish ownership)  -0.239* -0.0745*** -0.0770** -0.183*** -0.0296 -0.111 0.206*** 0.0675 
 * (after 2008) (0.139) (0.0259) (0.0307) (0.0582) (0.0653) (0.0718) (0.0653) (0.0604) 
7. (Spanish ownership)  -0.160 -0.0516** -0.0835*** -0.0747* -0.0867* -0.112*** 0.129*** 0.105** 
 * (after 2008) (0.112) (0.0233) (0.0255) (0.0394) (0.0455) (0.0418) (0.0427) (0.0408) 
8. (Spanish ownership)  -0.142 -0.0595** -0.0428 -0.0770* -0.0776 -0.0937** 0.148*** 0.125** 
 * (after 2008) (0.125) (0.0271) (0.0293) (0.0439) (0.0551) (0.0472) (0.0455) (0.0509) 
9. (Spanish firms)  -0.107 -0.0537** -0.0931*** -0.110** -0.0205 -0.0901* 0.131** 0.149** 
 * (after 2008) (0.189) (0.0254) (0.0303) (0.0538) (0.0390) (0.0503) (0.0569) (0.0584) 
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5B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average  
overtime hours) 
ln(wage  
bill) 
Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
ln(sales) ln(exports) 
         
Baseline:  (Spanish firms)  -0.0561*** 0.630* -0.0377* 0.0271*** -0.0415 -0.0500 -0.0602 
 * (after 2008) (0.0215) (0.360) (0.0208) (0.00966) (0.0606) (0.0316) (0.0578) 
2.  (Spanish firms 2 yrs ago) -0.0281 1.110*** -0.0189 0.02331** -0.0412 -0.0201 0.00618 
 * (after 2008) (0.0233) (0.407) (0.0219) (0.01055) (0.0655) (0.0351) (0.0616) 
3. (Spanish ownership)  -0.0624*** 0.681* -0.0418** 0.02765*** -0.0506 -0.0533 -0.0577 
 * (after 2008) (0.0219) (0.368) (0.0213) (0.00993) (0.0612) (0.0326) (0.0597) 
4. (Spanish ownership 2 yrs ago)  -0.0366 1.177*** -0.0225 0.02422** -0.0573 -0.0244 0.00383 
 * (after 2008) (0.0237) (0.409) (0.0226) (0.01094) (0.0662) (0.0366) (0.0639) 
5.  (Spanish firms)  -0.0402** 0.664 -0.0219 0.01147 0.0195 -0.0102 -0.0260 
 * (after 2008) (0.0201) (0.480) (0.0212) (0.00826) (0.0633) (0.0294) (0.0726) 
6.  (Spanish ownership)  -0.0512** 0.742 -0.0292 0.01217 0.00172 -0.0165 -0.0202 
 * (after 2008) (0.0211) (0.473) (0.0218) (0.00894) (0.0615) (0.0307) (0.0729) 
7. (Spanish ownership)  -0.0376** 0.721** -0.0169 0.0290*** 0.0133 n/a -0.0428 
 * (after 2008) (0.0173) (0.367) (0.0154) (0.00989) (0.0554) n/a (0.0547) 
8. (Spanish ownership)  -0.0260 0.392 -0.0136 0.0296** -0.00803 0.0290 -0.0223 
 * (after 2008) (0.0252) (0.447) (0.0237) (0.0121) (0.0746) (0.0363) (0.0677) 
9. (Spanish firms)  -0.0451 1.259* -0.0326 0.0296*** -0.194 0.0337 -0.0400 
 * (after 2008) (0.0339) (0.688) (0.0355) (0.0112) (0.119) (0.0696) (0.103) 
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 Table 6. Placebo tests 
 
Notes: This table compares a variety of investment decisions of Spanish and Foreign firms in every 
year between 2001 and 2010. The dependent variable is stated in the head of each column. The 
regressors are interaction terms of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign 
ownership in same year) and a dummy variable that indicates the specified year. All columns 
include full sets of firm fixed effects and industry*year fixed effects. All standard errors are two-
way clustered at firm level and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations 
are between 2000 and 2010. In the rows at the bottom of the table we conduct four different F-tests: 
testing the equality of the coefficient on the 2007 interaction term and the coefficient on the 2008, 
2009 and 2010 interaction terms, in order to check whether the financial crisis terms are 
significantly different from the pre-crisis year 2007. We also report the according p-values. The 
dependent variables in columns (4) to (8) are available only every four years, i.e. years 2002, 2006 
and 2010. 
 
6A. Innovation and Information Technology 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(invest 
ment) 
Product 
innovation 
dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD dummy LAN dummy Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software 
programmin
g  
outsource  
dummy 
Software 
application  
outsource 
dummy 
         
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00716 -0.0113 0.0192      
firms) * (year=2001) (0.0963) (0.0289) (0.0341)      
Interaction term (Spanish  0.0764 -0.00907 0.0245      
firms) * (year=2002) (0.142) (0.0297) (0.0310)      
Interaction term (Spanish  0.167 0.0247 0.0228      
firms) * (year=2003) (0.164) (0.0290) (0.0398)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00986 0.0209 0.0118      
firms) * (year=2004) (0.101) (0.0329) (0.0385)      
Interaction term (Spanish  0.0515 0.0559* 0.0109      
firms) * (year=2005) (0.156) (0.0297) (0.0375)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.116 0.00975 -0.0346 0.0655* -0.0433 -0.0138 -0.0639 0.0328 
firms) * (year=2006) (0.127) (0.0286) (0.0321) (0.0341) (0.0418) (0.0431) (0.0441) (0.0380) 
Interaction term (Spanish  0.117 0.0280 0.0210      
firms) * (year=2007) (0.131) (0.0297) (0.0383)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.123 -0.0285 -0.0775**      
firms) * (year=2008) (0.134) (0.0295) (0.0352)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.322** -0.0347 -0.0713*      
firms) * (year=2009) (0.161) (0.0321) (0.0401)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00426 -0.0572 -0.104*** -0.0408 -0.119** -0.117** 0.106** 0.121*** 
firms) * (year=2010) (0.198) (0.0379) (0.0390) (0.0426) (0.0511) (0.0494) (0.0508) (0.0460) 
         
Observations 12,351 19,348 19,612 4,265 4,265 4,265 4,257 4,257 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Number of firmid 2,432 3,093 3,112 1,733 1,733 1,733 1,729 1,729 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test 2007=2008 coef 2.457 9.741 11.72      
p-value 0.563 0.00904 0.00121      
F-test 2007=2009 coef 5.293 6.814 6.216      
p-value 0.0214 0.00180 0.0127      
F-test 2007=2010 coef 0.334 6.916 10.48      
p-value 0.117 0.00854 0.000618      
F-test 2006=2010 coef    6.699 2.808 4.891 14.52 4.200 
p-value    0.00965 0.0938 0.0270 0.000138 0.0404 
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6B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average 
overtime 
hours) 
ln(wage 
bill) 
Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00237 -0.465 0.00132 -0.0229*** 0.0211 
firms) * (year=2001) (0.0157) (0.388) (0.0145) (0.0066) (0.0345) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00481 -0.702 0.00824 -0.014** 0.104** 
firms) * (year=2002) (0.0154) (0.442) (0.0153) (0.0057) (0.0480) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0135 -0.600 -0.00668 -0.0084 0.0165 
firms) * (year=2003) (0.0145) (0.394) (0.0166) (0.0057) (0.0584) 
Interaction term (Spanish  0.00459 -0.630 0.00469 0.0012 0.0364 
firms) * (year=2004) (0.0191) (0.424) (0.0185) (0.0063) (0.0541) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0337 -0.466 -0.0312 0.0019 -0.0641 
firms) * (year=2005) (0.0222) (0.435) (0.0214) (0.0076) (0.0479) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0211 0.0873 -0.0100 0.0087 -0.0271 
firms) * (year=2006) (0.0215) (0.438) (0.0205) (0.0096) (0.0687) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00901 -0.0182 -0.00427 0.0188 -0.113 
firms) * (year=2007) (0.0269) (0.514) (0.0276) (0.0124) (0.0742) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0535** 0.234 -0.00776 0.0204* -0.0645 
firms) * (year=2008) (0.0269) (0.487) (0.0265) (0.0122) (0.0769) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0759*** 0.777 -0.0648** 0.0295** -0.0747 
firms) * (year=2009) (0.0294) (0.563) (0.0289) (0.0119) (0.0777) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0703** 0.211 -0.0628** 0.0379*** -0.0336 
firms) * (year=2010) (0.0322) (0.462) (0.0315) (0.0138) (0.104) 
      
Observations 19,612 19,558 19,609 19,592 13,454 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 
Number of firmid 3,112 3,106 3,111 3,104 2,378 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test 2007=2008 coef 6.582 0.286 0.0289 0.0345 0.587 
p-value 0.0103 0.171 0.865 0.102 0.599 
F-test 2007=2009 coef 10.93 1.873 7.325 1.296 0.277 
p-value 0.000944 0.593 0.00680 0.853 0.437 
F-test 2007=2010 coef 5.760 0.191 4.527 2.676 0.603 
p-value 0.0164 0.662 0.0334 0.255 0.444 
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Table 7. Comparison with the last economic crisis: 1993 
 
Notes: This table compares a variety of investment decisions of Spanish and Foreign firms after the 
economic crisis in 1993. The specification is analogous to our “baseline specification” in table 3. 
The dependent variable is stated in the head of each column. The main regressor is an interaction 
term of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign ownership in same year) and a 
dummy variable that indicates the economic crisis in 1993 (=1 in and after 1993). All columns 
include full sets of firm fixed effects and industry*year fixed effects. All standard errors are two-
way clustered at firm level and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations 
are between 1990 and 1995. Note, the variables investment and LAN dummy were not available 
before 1993.   
 
7A. Innovation and Information Technology 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Product 
innovation 
Dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD 
dummy 
Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software  
programming  
outsource  
dummy 
Software  
application  
outsource  
dummy 
       
Interaction term (Spanish firms)  -0.0481** -0.0623*** 0.0219 0.00884 -0.0496 0.00227 
* (after 1993) (0.0235) (0.0230) (0.0333) (0.0416) (0.0410) (0.0406) 
       
Observations 11,026 11,328 2,824 2,826 2,920 2,920 
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Number of firmid 2,286 2,301 1,412 1,413 1,460 1,460 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
7B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average  
overtime 
hours) 
ln(wage 
bill) 
Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
ln(sales) ln(exports) 
        
Interaction term (Spanish firms)  0.0423** -0.515 -0.0281 0.0164** -0.0918 -0.113*** -0.166** 
* (after 1993) (0.0174) (0.367) (0.0174) (0.00790) (0.0584) (0.0233) (0.0655) 
        
Observations 11,338 9,177 11,254 11,307 7,215 11,265 5,879 
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 
Number of firmid 2,301 2,160 2,292 2,290 1,691 2,293 1,287 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 8. Using Spanish ownership as instrument for credit crunch 
 
Notes: This table shows 2SLS regressions of a dependent variable (stated in the head of each 
column) on  the main regressor credit (total credit in percent of assets), using the interaction of 
Spanish ownership share with a dummy indicating the crisis (=1 in 2008, 2009 and 2010) as 
instrument for credit. The first stage of these regressions we have already shown in Table 1 before, 
however, we report the F-statistics of the first stage in the last row.  All columns include full sets of 
firm fixed effects and industry*year fixed effects. All standard errors are two-way clustered at firm 
level and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2000 and 
2010. 
 
 
 
8A. Innovation and Information Technology 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(invest 
ment) 
Product 
innovation 
dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD  
dummy 
LAN  
dummy 
Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software  
programming  
outsource  
dummy 
Software  
application  
outsource  
dummy 
         
Credit in % of assets 8.988 1.280** 2.334*** 2.275* 2.497* 3.419** -2.953** -2.385* 
(between 0 and 1) (6.766) (0.628) (0.864) (1.330) (1.316) (1.590) (1.337) (1.301) 
         
Observations 12,058 18,718 18,983 4,087 4,087 4,087 4,079 4,079 
Partial R-squared -0.318 -0.252 -0.484 -0.661 -0.799 -1.335 -0.783 -0.531 
Number of firmid 2,389 3,030 3,051 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,665 1,665 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
First stage 3.251 15.19*** 14.59*** 9.001*** 9.001*** 9.001*** 9.169*** 9.043*** 
(p-velue) (0.0728) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0039) 
 
8B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average  
overtime 
hours) 
ln(wagebill) Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
ln(sales) ln(exports) 
        
Credit in % of assets 1.709** -16.84* 1.159** -0.639** 0.817 1.615* 2.451 
(between 0 and 1) (0.678) (10.00) (0.591) (0.2949) (1.407) (0.924) (1.904) 
        
Observations 18,983 18,931 18,983 18,965 13,167 18,983 12,099 
Partial R-squared -0.622 -0.227 -0.306 -0.668 -0.020 -0.324 -0.096 
Number of firmid 3,051 3,045 3,051 3,044 2,334 3,051 2,028 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
First stage 14.59*** 14.99*** 14.59*** 14.62*** 11.19*** 14.59*** 8.892*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0032) 
 
  
